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1D t ti d d t i blie ec ng an  e err ng pu c 
computer misuse: 
the FRILLS project
•Presentation for the SLIC AGM and IDF showcase, 5/11/8
What is FRILLS?
• FRILLS = Forensic Readiness for Local 
Libraries in Scotland
• Research Team:
Alan Poulter–  
– Ian Ferguson
– Richard Glassey
• http://frills.cis.strath.ac.uk
• Plus a large cast of questionnaire respondees 
and interviewees – to whom many thanks are 
due! 
Proposal outline
• “Aims to develop simple, low-cost techniques to 
provide a basic forensic readiness (FR) regime for 
public access ICT facilities, in order to deter misuse 
of those facilities by better detection of misuse”       
• “Successful FR needs suitable staff training and 
management procedures for routine examination, 
incident reporting and elevation to enable the 
proactive seeking out of misuse whilst offering 
privacy.”
2Specific aims
• create a typology of misuse of public access 
computer facilities
• specify a flexible FR regime which fits the 
needs and constraints imposed by a variety       
of library ICT facilities 
• develop management procedures to  
activate/review/terminate FR activity, satisfy 
privacy/freedom of access and report 
findings to the appropriate authorities
Methodology
• Carry out literature reviews of computer misuse via 
public access IT (libraries and cybercafes) + 
computer forensics tools
• Carry out online survey of Heads of Library        
Service, Library IT Managers, and library staff 
regarding computer misuse they had experienced
• Interview Heads of Library Service and Library IT 
Managers at volunteer pilot sites for their 
perspective/needs/situation
• Develop and test an FR logger with pilot sites
Literature review of computer misuse
• Found evidence of misuse of public access facilities, 
typically involving pornography or child pornography.
• Misuse in cybercafés exhibited a very similar profile to 
that of misuse in public libraries:
– e.g. the main EasyInternet cyber café in Glasgow had been used by a customer 
to distribute child pornography.
• Other forms of misuse: 
– e.g. EasyInternet cyber cafés had been sued for £210,000 for allowing 
customers to download music illegally
• The detection and resolution of misuse had caused 
severe stress for library staff involved:
– e.g. in a Welsh library a staff member had been sacked for refusing to serve a 
user who had served a ban for viewing pornography
– e.g. in the United States a probationary staff member was sacked for giving 
police the name of a user allegedly viewing pornography, after being told to 
follow library procedures first.
3Staff experience of computer misuse
• Broad agreement that Internet access should not be 
monitored – but many library staff were aware of 
misuse and in favour of controls
• Checking for misuse e.g. via URL history was extremely 
l t t dunp easan  o o
• The more checking was done, the more misuse was 
found’
• Acceptable Use Policies (AUPs) breached e.g. porn, 
chat, IM, Bebo, letterhead forgery and more
• AUPs written in English “legalese”, difficult to 
enforce/explain, not kept up to date, problem of defining 
‘unacceptable content’, not in minority languages
• No standard recording of misuse
Create a flexible FR logging system 
• Focused on Windows XP + Explorer + Office as core 
logging targets – problem of variety of other targets
• Browser/chat logging would get core coverage as main 
areas of  reported abuse
L i ld t d d t l• ogg ng wou  no  recor  user passwor s on ex erna  
systems
• Minimise software development by reusing existing 
freeware tools
• Use XML to develop a structure for log files
• Developed the Autonomous Logging Framework (ALF)
• Implications for network traffic and long-term storage of 
log records
ALF (Autonomous Logging Framework )
4Work with pilot sites to develop FRILLS
• The response from IT Services to the technology survey 
was extremely poor
– It was by necessity extremely detailed in its 
questioning
Some Council IT operations were outsourced which–      ,  
did not help data gathering
• Some Council IT staff were interviewed: 
– to them public access IT in libraries was very much a 
service ‘add-on’ and not a core offering
– they appeared to be doing some logging of access 
for misuse checking themselves. However they were 
not willing to allow ALF to be used on their networks. 
– tried to simulate a library IT setup in our Lab but 
could not afford Deep Freeze license
Outcomes: Service issues
• Need for a standard AUP, centrally updated, available 
in a large number of languages?
• Need for more checking of user understanding of 
AUPs? (e.g. online tests)
N d f t d d d d t f lti f• ee  or a s an ar  proce ure an  se  o  pena es or 
dealing with misuse?
• Need for a central register of misuse cases?
• More advice on Internet privacy and data security could 
be offered to users?
Outcomes: Logging issues
• Uses:
– ‘non-ID’ drop-in access
– wifi access
– to avoid confrontations with users in cases of suspected misuse
to give users an authenticated record of their session–         
– non-filtered access
• Technical:
– Suspect, but cannot prove, that hacking is going on
– Implementation needs to be flexible enough to met a wide 
variety of local use scenarios
– How might the unpleasant task of checking logs for evidence of 
misuse be automated?
– How robust is the logging against expert interference?
